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Abstract
Background: Vertically oriented global health initiatives (GHIs) addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic, including 
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), have successfully contributed to reducing HIV/AIDS 
related morbidity and mortality. However, there is still debate about whether these disease-specific programs have 
improved or harmed health systems overall, especially with respect to non-HIV health needs.
Methods: As part of a larger evaluation of PEPFAR’s effects on the health system between 2005-2011, we collected 
qualitative and quantitative data through semi-structured interviews with District Health Officers (DHOs) from 
all 112 districts in Uganda. We asked DHOs to share their perceptions about the ways in which HIV programs 
(largely PEPFAR in the Ugandan context) had helped and harmed the health system. We then identified key 
themes among their responses using qualitative content analysis. 
Results: Ugandan DHOs said PEPFAR had generally helped the health system by improving training, integrating 
HIV and non-HIV care, and directly providing resources. To a lesser extent, DHOs said PEPFAR caused the 
health system to focus too narrowly on HIV/AIDS, increased workload for already overburdened staff, and 
encouraged doctors to leave public sector jobs for higher-paid positions with HIV/AIDS programs.
Conclusion: Health system leaders in Uganda at the district level were appreciative of resources aimed at HIV 
they could often apply for broader purposes. As HIV infection becomes a chronic disease requiring strong 
health systems to manage sustained patient care over time, Uganda’s weak health systems will require broad 
infrastructure improvements inconsistent with narrow vertical health programming. 
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Implications for policy makers
• District Health Officers (DHOs) and other public sector health managers have a unique perspective on the massive growth in the number 
of individuals on HIV care and treatment since 2003. As Uganda and other countries with high HIV prevalence align with the latest World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommendations and adopt universal HIV test and start treatment strategies, their input will be invaluable to the 
development of effective and sustainable policies. 
• HIV is quickly becoming a chronic infection requiring increased health system capacity to manage an exponential rise in the number of 
individuals on HIV treatment. It is important to leverage HIV support for broader health system strengthening.
• Policy-makers should consider continuing to monitor the extent to which funding specifically targeted for HIV programs may make it more 
difficult for public sector health managers to mobilize resources for non-HIV programs.
Implications for the public
The global community has set a goal to eliminate AIDS by 2030, but doing so will require massively expanding HIV testing and treatment programs. 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and other global health initiatives (GHIs) directly targeting HIV have proven it is possible to 
scale-up HIV treatment services quickly and effectively. Yet, it remains unclear how growing HIV programs have strengthened and stressed broader 
health systems. The experience of Ugandan District Health Officers (DHOs) between 2005-2011 illustrates many of the opportunities and challenges 
public sector health managers will face as HIV programs continue to enroll more people on treatment. It is important the public be engaged in this 
process of expansion by supporting those on HIV treatment, demanding donors continue to fund treatment for those who cannot afford it, and 
advocating HIV funding be employed for broader health service delivery. As echoed by the comments of Ugandan DHOs, it will take broad-scale 
engagement of both HIV-negative and -positive Ugandans to ensure the substantial funding entering Uganda vertically targeted at HIV programs 
supports sustainable health system improvement.
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Politics and Power in Global Health: The Constituting Role 
of Conflicts
Comment on “Navigating Between Stealth Advocacy and Unconscious Dogmatism: The 
Challenge of Researching the Norms, Politics and Power of Global Health”
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Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, a d collective 
mobilization based on su h an articulation.
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In a recent con ribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the n rmative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a la k of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for g e ter unity betwe n scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend he effort o reinstate p wer nd politics in 
global healt  an  agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the conc rns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to ove away from,” Ooms is submitting to  liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly riticizes the outcomes
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts a d reduces it to either a rationalistic, eco omic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or deri ed from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative concept alization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontol gical 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial a d precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize a  issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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Background 
More than 10 years now since its inception, there is general 
consensus the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) has been successful at its main goal – to reduce 
the morbidity and mortality from HIV/AIDS in targeted low-
income countries.1,2 Among other positive effects specifically 
pertaining to HIV, PEPFAR increased equity and access to 
antiretroviral treatment (ART), raised standards of care, and 
improved diagnostic laboratory capacity.3-6 However, the jury 
is still out as to whether PEPFAR investment contributed 
to strengthen, perhaps undermined, or had no effect on 
broader health systems. Did PEPFAR provide much needed 
funding, energy, and support to health systems in countries 
where it operated, either by “spilling-over” resources from 
its predominantly vertical HIV/AIDS programs, or by 
directly investing in health system strengthening beginning 
in 2008, as some have hypothesized?7,8 Conversely, did 
PEPFAR undermine health systems, even if unintentionally, 
by recruiting health workers away from primary care duties, 
distracting health decision-makers, establishing parallel 
service delivery and reporting structures, and prioritizing 
HIV/AIDS over potentially more pressing challenges, as 
others have suggested?5,6,9-12 
Studies attempting to investigate PEPFAR’s influence on 
health systems offer mixed evidence for productive and 
counterproductive effects. Some researchers have observed 
positive effects on primary care,8,13 increased vaccination 
rates, antenatal care coverage, malaria diagnoses, and 
treatment of sexually transmitted diseases.13-16 There is 
evidence, however, health service providers have shifted 
focus from primary care duties, leading some to challenge 
the reports of positive PEPFAR spillover.11,12,17 While some 
studies have demonstrated PEPFAR was associated with 
effective task-shifting, improved in-service training, and 
higher job satisfaction,5,6,18 other studies have noted an 
internal brain-drain of doctors from the public sector to HIV 
programs run by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
work interruption for training, and overburdening of a health 
workforce already spread thin.3-6,9,17,19 
Despite this burgeoning body of literature analyzing the 
interactions between PEPFAR and health systems, few 
researchers have asked public sector health managers 
in low-income countries what they think about how 
PEPFAR influenced the health system. This is a noteworthy 
shortcoming because their views could valuably inform 
PEPFAR policy. Studies which have included analyses of 
stakeholder experiences have relied on a small number of 
interviews in a limited geographical area,16,20 focused on the 
experiences of patients21 and policy-makers,6,9 or assessed 
the marginalization of civil society organizations.22 Many 
studies have avoided distinguishing between PEPFAR, the 
Global Fund, and the World Bank’s Multi-Country HIV/
AIDS Program, and have instead examined the net effects of 
global health initiatives (GHIs) generally.5,19,23 Those studies 
which have assessed a single initiative have tended to focus 
on the Global Fund.24-39 This is an important distinction 
because there are valid reasons to believe the varied policies 
and approaches of each GHI may have interacted with health 
systems in distinct ways.40 
At the outset of PEPFAR in 2004, 960 000 people were living 
with HIV in Uganda,41 of whom fewer than 50 000 were 
receiving life-saving ART (Table 1). Uganda experienced 
significant population growth,42 and it had, and continues to 
have, an acute shortage of health workers43 and low domestic 
investment in health at 11% of public expenditure, or $52 
per capita.44 PEPFAR implementing agencies initially made a 
strategic decision to rapidly expand HIV care and treatment 
services in order to save lives and control the spread of the 
epidemic. To do so as quickly as possible, PEPFAR created 
and used HIV-specific systems when existing government 
systems were deemed insufficient, such as parallel supply 
chain systems, funding mechanisms, information systems, 
and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes.9,26,45 The 
majority of programmatic funding flowed to implementing 
partners, mostly US-based NGOs, with little direct financial 
support allocated to Ugandan government health budgets. 
These programs slowed HIV incidence and significantly 
expanded access to ART. By 2010, more than 200 000 HIV-
positive Ugandans were receiving treatment (Table 1), and by 
2015 this figure had grown to an estimated 740 000.46 During 
subsequent funding phases, particularly 2008-2013, PEPFAR 
and other GHIs updated their strategies to include funding 
intended to strengthen the health systems required to sustain 
a long-term HIV response.22,47,48 However, in Uganda as in 
other PEPFAR “focus countries,” it remains an open question 
whether PEPFAR has strengthened, weakened, or had little 
effect on the overall health system. 
To address this knowledge gap, our study gathered textual data 
characterizing District Health Officers’ (DHOs) perceptions 
of how PEPFAR affected health system strength in Uganda 
2005-2011. We hypothesized Ugandan DHOs would perceive 
PEPFAR strengthened the health system overall, particularly 
in the areas of health workforce trainings, increased access to 
medical supplies and equipment, and improved financing for 
the health sector. We also hypothesized DHOs would perceive 
PEPFAR implementation prompted the movement of health 
workers out of the public sector and focused attention on HIV 
programming at the expense of primary healthcare delivery. 
Table 1. Ugandan ART Patient Volume and Health Sector Funding by Source 2005-2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ART patientsa 49 638 51 397 83 549 130 837 175 367 207 872
Ugandan government allocation to health sectorb ($ in millions) 129.2 132.2 164.6 226.4 217.9 258.9
Donor projects and other GHIsb ($ in millions) 150.8 75.9 83.8 152.6 147.7 41.5
PEPFAR donor contributionsc ($ in millions) 146.9 170.0 236.6 283.6 285.9 286.3
Abbreviations: ART, antiretroviral treatment; GHIs, global health initiatives; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.
Data sources: a Uganda Monitoring and Evaluation of the Emergency Plan Progress (MEEPP) data provided by Social and Scientific Systems, Inc.
b Uganda’s Annual Health Sector Performance Report 2010/2011, page 26 Table 15.
c US Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, PEPFAR, September 2010 GAO-10-836.
Lohman et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2017, 6(2), 83–95 85
Therefore, DHOs would have mixed views of PEPFAR’s 
influence on the health system.
To our knowledge, this is the first survey assessing the effects 
of PEPFAR on the experiences of DHOs across an entire 
country. Moreover, because contributions from PEPFAR 
were much larger than from other GHIs, constituting 73% of 
Uganda’s budget for HIV activities and more than a quarter 
of total health sector funding in 2006 as reported Oomman 
et al,40 and outpacing both Ugandan government health 
allocations and contributions from other GHIs each year 
2005-2010 (Table 1), this study inherently focuses more on 
the effects of PEPFAR than many previous analyses.
Ugandan DHOs’ perceptions of PEPFAR are necessary to 
determine whether the vertical strategy for HIV programs 
helped or hurt the health system as a whole. Though PEPFAR 
in Uganda is largely a vertical program outside the direct 
control of DHOs or the Ministry of Health (MoH), DHOs are 
responsible for managing the delivery of public sector health 
services for both HIV and non-HIV care. Moreover, given 
the Ugandan context of a shift towards decentralized health 
authority and decision-making, DHO roles are increasingly 
important.5,22,40,48,49 
Methods
This mixed-methods analysis of Ugandan DHOs’ perceptions 
about the positive and negative effects of PEPFAR is part 
of a larger evaluation of the influences PEPFAR had on the 
Ugandan health system between 2005-2011. For this paper, 
we collected quantitative and qualitative data through semi-
structured interviews with leaders at each Ugandan district 
health office. After obtaining written consent to participate, 
we first asked each DHO to categorize whether PEPFAR’s 
influence on seven separate health system components (fully 
described below) had been positive, negative, or neutral. 
We then prompted DHOs to provide comments on each 
component. We had 30 to 60 minutes of the DHOs’ time 
to complete the questionnaire. During analysis, we used 
the categorical responses to complement the positive and 
negative comments each DHO offered and determine how 
much emphasis to place on each comment. We established 
the relative salience of positive and negative comments 
concerning each health system component based upon: (1) 
the number of DHOs making similar remarks and (2) the 
relative proportion of DHOs who categorized PEPFAR’s 
effects on that health system component as positive, negative, 
or neutral. 
The project was funded with a PEPFAR Public Health 
Evaluation award to the University of Washington (UW) 
from the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in late 2010. 
Prior to issuing the award, the health systems team in the 
Health Economics, Systems and Integration Branch, Division 
of Global AIDS, at CDC had outlined a proposed research 
protocol. The UW, in partnership with Makerere University 
and CDC, prepared the final research protocol, including 
sampling strategy and analysis plan. Makerere University, 
Kampala, Uganda provided in-country implementation 
including leadership, project management, development of 
the questionnaire, and data collection. The Uganda office of 
the CDC and the Resource Center at the Ugandan MoH also 
made valuable contributions to the research.
Table 2. Survey Respondents Categorized by Professional Title
Professional Title of 
Respondent
No. of 
Respondents
Years in District 
Median (Range)
DHO 74 4.0 (<1–21)
Assistant DHO 12 5.5 (<1–18)
District Health Educator 8 6.0 (1–20)
District Health Inspector 7 11.0 (1–25)
HIV/AIDS Focal Person 4 6.0 (1–22)
Senior Clinical Officer 3 4.0 (1–25)
Medical Superintendent 2 1.0
Public Health Nurse 1 10.0
Missing 1 1.0
Total 112 4.5 (<1–25)
Abbreviation: DHO, District Health Officer.
Data source: Interviews with Ugandan DHOs (or their proxies) in 112 
districts between October and December, 2011.
Makerere University hired research assistants to collect 
data from the 112 district health offices. Recent university 
graduates, many with degrees in health and social sciences, 
comprised most of the team, along with some junior faculty. 
We conducted a one-week training in October 2011 to orient 
our team to the goals and the research protocol and provided 
a field manual outlining data collection procedures (manual 
available upon request). 
Following the training, the research assistants were divided 
into six teams and assigned a geographical region. Each 
team consisted of three data collectors, one of whom was the 
designated leader. During the first week of data collection, 
each team visited and gathered data from nine district health 
offices and submitted these data to the research leadership 
team at Makerere University to be reviewed for thoroughness 
and to troubleshoot any problems. The teams then returned 
to the field and completed data collection from the district 
health offices by late December 2011. 
District health offices were informed of the research project 
in advance by a letter from the MoH authorizing participation 
in the research. The research assistants then contacted each 
district health office to schedule their visit, confirmed their 
appointment with a call the day prior to arrival, and carried 
a letter of introduction from the MoH. In addition to the 
interviews with DHOs, we collected quantitative data from 
the routine MoH health management information system 
(HMIS) reports (fully described in Luboga et al50). Consent 
forms promised DHOs their identities would be kept 
confidential in our reports.
We conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with 
DHOs to gather their perceptions of PEPFAR’s effects on 
health system components. If DHOs were unavailable, 
instructions prompted interviewers to speak with “the most 
senior district health officials or someone very knowledgeable 
about the district health office.” Table 2 details the professional 
titles and years of experience in their current district of the 
respondents. Our interview guide is available upon request. 
The team leaders administered the interview while a second 
member wrote responses on the interview guide. We 
determined handwritten responses were sufficient, and audio 
recording was unnecessary because our research question 
was neither interpretive nor reliant on the precise tone or 
syntax of the responses. All members of the data collection 
teams had been trained to take accurate notes and probe 
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respondents for rich responses. Paper copies of the completed 
interview guides were scanned in the field, and the electronic 
copies were uploaded into a secured project “Dropbox.” Team 
members then transcribed the responses from the handwritten 
copies to digital format. These electronic transcripts were also 
uploaded to the password-protected “Dropbox,” where UW 
and Makerere researchers accessed them for analysis.
We used the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) six 
building blocks for strong health systems51 to structure the 
questionnaire topics including the capacity to plan, monitor 
and evaluate, manage medical equipment, develop human 
resources (HRs), coordinate stakeholders in the health 
system, mobilize financial resources, and manage information 
systems. In this paper, we refer to these key areas of the health 
system as “components.” The interview guides included 
items that asked: (1) whether informants thought PEPFAR 
investment had improved, had no effect on, or decreased 
each component of the health system as related to the non-
HIV health system; (2) to list and explain a few ways in which 
the PEPFAR investment had both positively and negatively 
affected each key component as it related to non-HIV 
health service delivery, regardless of whether their overall 
impression was of improvement, neutrality, or reduction; (3) 
to state whether their district had completed a number of key 
exercises pertaining to each health system building block in 
2005/2006, 2006/2007, or 2010/2011; (4) to hypothesize two 
or three potential explanations why the quantitative aspects 
of this program analysis might find the PEPFAR investment 
had positive or negative effects on non-HIV health indicators; 
(5) to make any comments they would like to be included in 
the study.
Using the scanned copies of the structured interview guides 
containing the handwritten responses from each interview, we 
confirmed the electronic transcriptions entered into CSPro in 
the field were complete and accurate. In the instances where 
the electronic transcripts had been misentered or truncated, 
we corrected the electronic transcripts to reflect the notes 
taken during each interview verbatim. 
Our coding team identified key themes and subthemes 
inductively through open free coding and analyzed these 
themes in ATLAS.ti using a content analysis approach.52 After 
initial coding, we checked intercoder agreement by randomly 
selecting 15 of the 112 transcripts and having a second member 
of the research team (TL) independently code them using the 
code book we had developed. We determined 15 transcripts 
was a sufficient sample to test intercoder agreement because 
all key themes and subthemes appeared more than once 
within the sampled transcripts, and many appeared multiple 
times. After the transcripts of the 15 interviews chosen had 
been coded by the second coder, the two coders compared 
how they had applied the codes and discussed the instances 
in which they had coded the transcripts differently. Based on 
the consensus the two coders reached about how and why 
they had applied the codes differently in each instance, the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria for each code were edited to 
minimize discrepancy between coders. We then applied the 
codes with the revised inclusion and exclusion criteria to the 
remaining 97 interview transcripts. 
Results 
District Health Officer Perceptions and Experiences
We interviewed DHOs (or their proxies) about how health 
systems and health facilities in their district were managed, 
including their current situation (2010/2011) and their best 
recall of two periods in the past (2005/2006, 2007/2008) with 
regard to the seven health system components described in 
the Methods section. The goal was to assess whether, during 
this period of PEPFAR engagement in Uganda, there was 
a trend towards districts more completely performing a 
number of key activities to strengthen each health system 
building block (listed in the column titled “Non-HIV Service 
Delivery Outcome” of Table 4), and to determine if DHOs 
perceived PEPFAR had improved, harmed, or had no effect 
on the health system.
Ugandan DHOs generally reported the PEPFAR investment 
from 2005-2011 was helpful for the country’s overall health 
system. When asked to categorize PEPFAR’s overall effects on 
the health system as beneficial, detrimental, or having had no 
effect, 79% of respondents asserted the effects were beneficial, 
8% claimed the effects were detrimental, and 9% responded 
there were no net effects. An additional 4% either did not 
know or reported mixed effects (Table 3). 
Examining DHO perceptions of PEPFAR’s effects on each 
health system component individually, respondents in 
large numbers (78%-92%) reported PEPFAR’s effects as 
beneficial for six of the seven health system components 
studied: planning capacity, M&E capacity, management of 
medical supplies, human resource (HR) capacity, stakeholder 
coordination, and information management. 
Planning Capacity
Almost all (98%) DHOs reported they had a strategic plan in 
2011, and 80% of these plans included the activities of NGOs 
working within the district (Table 4). Overall, 85% of DHOs 
said PEPFAR improved their ability to plan (Table 3). 
Monitoring and Evaluation
Only about half of DHOs said private labs were monitored, but 
Table 3. Uganda DHO Views of the Effects of PEPFAR on Non-HIV Health System Components
Planning 
Capacity (%)
M&E Capacity 
(%)
Mobilize 
Resources (%)
Manage Medical 
Supplies (%)
HR Capacity 
(%)
Coordinate 
Stakeholders (%)
Manage 
Information (%)
Total (%)
Improved 93 (83.0) 91 (81.3) 51 (45.5) 100 (89.3) 88 (78.6) 103 (92.0) 94 (83.9) 620 (79.1)
No effect 8 (7.1) 7 (6.3) 33 (29.5) 7 (6.3) 4 (3.6) 5 (4.5) 7 (6.3) 71 (9.1)
Decreased 5 (4.5) 12 (10.7) 25 (22.3) 2 (1.8) 12 (10.7) 2 (1.8) 3 (2.7) 61 (7.8)
Mixed 3 (2.7) 1 (0.9) 1 (0.9) 2 (1.8) 7 (6.3) 1 (0.9) 1 (0.9) 16 (2.0)
Do not know 3 (2.7) 1 (0.9) 2 (1.8) 1 (0.9) 1 (0.9) 1 (0.9) 7 (6.3) 16 (2.0)
Abbreviations: DHO, District Health Officer; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; HR, human resource; M&E, monitoring and evaluation.
Data source: Interviews with Ugandan DHOs (or their proxies) in 112 districts between October and December, 2011. Answer choices offered to the respondents 
were the five in the table: improved, no effect, decreased, mixed, or do not know.
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Table 4. Uganda DHO Characterization of Health System Components in Their Districts, 2005-2011
Non-HIV Service Delivery Outcome 2005/2006 2007/2008 2010/2011
Planning Capacity
Did this district have a strategic plan that covers the year 2011?
98% Yes (but only 43% of these plans were observed) 
80% of these included NGOs and 61% included CBOs.
M&E
Did you use national guidelines on support supervision? 91% 88% 90% 
Were private clinics monitored? 69% 65% 68% 
Were private labs monitored? 57% 51% 55%
Were private drug shops monitored? 76% 81% 76%
Resource Mobilization 
Did this district apply for funds or send out proposal applications beyond the ministry of health (to 
a non-government funding opportunity)? 
31% 44% 49% 
Managing Medical Supplies and Equipment
Did you have a district assistant inspector for drugs? 75% 72% 60% 
If not, did you have someone formally assigned to conduct drug inspections in the district? 59% 65% 66% 
Did you have reports on state of equipment and inventory needs in the district? 65% 76% 76% 
Managing HRs for Health
Did the district have a functional service commission? 90% 91% 62% 
Did the district have a HRs for health development plan? 63% 66% 84%
Was there a computerized system for tracking the number and movement of health workers (eg, 
HMIS)?
16% 19% 40%
Was there a “hard to reach” allowance to attract health workers? 7% 21% 23%
Was there a “pay for performance” scheme? 5% 4% 5%
Was there a career development opportunity, such as study leave? 51% 54% 57%
Were there short-term trainings available (eg, workshops)? 58% 61% 67%
Were there top-up allowances or bonuses? 21% 30% 38%
How many technical staff were working in the district office, as a proportion of population? (per 
1000 population)
0.020 0.022 0.027
How many support staff were working in the district office, as a proportion of population? (per 
1000 population)
0.011 0.012 0.013
Was there a time the DHO position was vacant or filled by an acting appointee between 2005-
2011?
No vacancies = 22%, 74% vacant with an acting
How many DHOs has the district had since 2005?
65% had only 1 (no turnover), 22% had 2, 13% had 3 
or more
Engaging and Coordinating Stakeholders
Did you have a desk officer for coordinating public/private partnerships for health in the district? 22% 24% 42% 
Did you conduct any activity to determine the level of community satisfaction with health services 
in the district?
42% 47% 59%
Managing Information Systems and Outbreak Investigations
Did the district have a staff person with a degree in statistics or biostatistics in charge of HMIS? 9% 31% 45%
If not, did you have someone responsible for analyzing routine data in the district? 97% 98% 98%
How was routine data stored in the district? 
Electronically 2% 6% 7%
On paper 45% 29% 12%
Both 53% 65% 80%
How was routine data transmitted from the district to Ministry HQ? 
Electronically 6% 27% 56%
On paper 75% 49% 10%
Both 19% 23% 33%
Did your district participate in an outbreak investigation? 20% 46% 42%
Abbreviations: DHO, District Health Officer; HRs, human resources; NGOs, non-governmental organizations; HMIS, health management information system; 
CBOs, community-based organizations; HQ, headquarters.
Percentages displayed reflect the portion of respondents answering “Yes” unless otherwise noted.
Table provided for descriptive purposes. Full quantitative analyses and discussion of statistical tests for trends 2005-2011 provided in Luboga et al.50
2/3 said private clinics were supervised and 3/4 said private 
drug shops were monitored. These figures did not change 
substantially over the period of PEPFAR investment, though 
81% of DHOs said HIV initiatives improved their ability to 
monitor and evaluate non-HIV services in their districts.
Resource Mobilization
PEPFAR intended to increase the capacity, interest, and 
success of host country health leadership in seeking 
additional third-party funding to improve ownership and 
sustainability.53 Half (49%) of DHOs said they had applied 
for funds to support their operations beyond the MoH, 
from either an NGO or other donor, up from about a third 
at the start of PEPFAR programming. However, only about 
half (46%) said PEPFAR improved their ability to mobilize 
resources in their districts, an additional one in five (22%) 
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said it decreased their ability to do so, and a third (30%) said 
it had no effect. DHOs predominantly attributed this mixed 
effect on resource mobilization to the unavailability of grants 
for non-HIV related health programs as well as the perception 
that the windfall of HIV funding had sufficiently provided for 
the entire health sector (Table 5).
In comparison, very few DHOs (3%) said PEPFAR had 
harmed management of medical supplies, ability to coordinate 
stakeholders, and information management capacity. Slightly 
more DHOs (5%) reported a negative effect on planning 
capacity, and 11% said PEPFAR had been detrimental both to 
M&E capacity and HR capacity. 
Management of Medical Supplies
Though nearly 90% of DHOs said HIV programs had 
improved their district’s ability to manage medical supplies, 
Table 5. Uganda DHO Views on Positive and Negative Effects of PEPFAR on Health System Components
Improved Non-HIV Health Services Health System Building Blocks Weakened Non-HIV Health Services
•	 Financial support for planning meetings (33)
•	 More HIV programs incorporated into the planning 
process (33)
•	 Additional trainings and mentorship for planning (32)
•	 Technical consultation for planning provided to DHO 
(23)
Planning Capacity
•	 HIV programs do not share work plans with DHO (34)
•	 HIV program work plans too narrowly focus on HIV (32)
•	 Planned projects will not be sustained when HIV 
programs close (16)
•	 DHO and funder budget cycles differ (6)
•	 M&E for non-HIV integrated into HIV monitoring (59)
•	 M&E training conducted (35)
•	 HIV organizations carry out or directly fund non-HIV 
M&E (24)
•	 Additional transport available for non-HIV monitoring 
visits (9)
Monitoring and Evaluating non-
HIV Programs
•	 Too much funding for, and focus on, HIV M&E (37)
•	 DHO staff overwhelmed by additional M&E 
responsibilities (14)
•	 DHO does not receive M&E reports from HIV 
organizations (10)
•	 Scaled-up M&E will not be sustained when HIV programs 
close (4)
•	 Technical help provided to identify and pursue non-HIV 
grants (25)
•	 Resources provided by HIV programs also used for non-
HIV programming (11)
•	 Additional funding for HIV work allows DHO to dedicate 
own funds to non-HIV work (10)
•	 Help identifying program gaps and effectively allocating 
funds (9)
Resource Mobilization for non-
HIV
•	 Available grants focused too narrowly on HIV (32)
•	 Health sector misperceived as having sufficient funding 
(21)
•	 DHO sits back and waits for funders to come (12)
•	 Development partners outcompete DHO for available 
grants (7)
•	 Training provided in use and maintenance of medical 
equipment (80)
•	 Direct provision of medical equipment and supplies 
(74)
•	 Transport for medicines and diagnostic specimens (20)
•	 Renovation of labs, storage areas, and waiting shades 
(13)
Management of Medical 
Supplies and Equipment
•	 Dependence on donors for drugs and supplies (11)
•	 Maintenance of scaled-up diagnostic and treatment 
services will not be possible when HIV programs close 
(10)
•	 Push systems deliver drugs and supplies that are not 
needed (9)
•	 Demand for services has risen with increased medical 
supply availability (2)
•	 Training and mentoring improves capacity and builds 
morale (75)
•	 HIV programs hire and pay additional staff to work at 
DHO (50)
•	 Opportunity for additional allowances motivates work 
(46)
•	 Improved work space and equipment boosts morale 
(15)
HRs for Health
•	 Increased workload and stress (46)
•	 Staff loss to NGO programs (45)
•	 Absenteeism to attend trainings (29)
•	 Damaged morale of staff not working on HIV (19)
•	 Funding and facilitation of stakeholder meetings 
provided (86)
•	 Trained and equipped village health teams and 
community groups (32)
•	 Funding and production of health-themed radio 
programs (19)
•	 HIV programs assist the formation of coordinating 
committees and forums (15)
Coordination of Stakeholders
•	 Those attending coordinating meetings now expect to be 
paid (9)
•	 DHO will not be able to sustain coordination effort when 
HIV programs close (9)
•	 DHO has insufficient funds to coordinate all stakeholders 
in the district (6)
•	 HIV programs do not participate in coordination 
meetings (5)
•	 Training and capacity building in data capture and 
analysis provided (83)
•	 Provision of computers, internet, and data storage (80)
•	 Transport and allowances provided for data collection 
(19)
•	 HIV programs provided forms and registers for data 
collection (17)
Management of Information
•	 Increased data collection workload (22)
•	 Individual reports needed for each HIV program (21)
•	 DHO does not receive data collected by HIV programs 
(20)
•	 HIV data collection overly emphasized (13)
Abbreviations: DHO, District Health Officer; HRs, human resources; NGO, non-governmental organization; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief; M&E, monitoring and evaluation.
Data source: Interviews with Ugandan DHOs (or their proxies) in 112 districts between October and December, 2011. Number of respondents citing each 
effect in parentheses.
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the portion of districts reporting the completion of key 
activities changed modestly 2005-2011. Three-quarters (76%) 
of DHOs said they had received reports detailing the state 
of medical equipment and inventory needs in 2010/2011, 
up from 65% in 2005/2006. During this same period, the 
percentage of districts with a designated inspector for drugs 
dropped from 75% to 60%. 
Human Resources
Most DHOs (90%) said they used the national guidelines for 
supportive supervision, and their district had been doing so 
since before PEPFAR started. Similarly, 84% said they had a 
plan for developing HR capacity at the time of the interview 
(2011).
Stakeholder Coordination 
About 42% of DHOs said their districts now had a desk 
officer for coordinating public/private partnerships, whereas 
only 22% had such a position at the start of PEPFAR. Also, 
59% said they had conducted activities to determine levels 
of community satisfaction in 2010/2011, up from 42% in 
2005/2006.
Information Management 
The biggest changes over the PEPFAR investment period were 
in the area of information systems. Whereas at the start of 
PEPFAR, only 9% had a staff person with a degree in statistics 
in charge of the HMIS, by 2011, almost half (45%) said 
they did. Data were routinely transmitted to the Ministry’s 
Resource Center electronically by almost all (89%) districts, 
whereas only half (55%) did so in 2007/2008. Fully 90% of 
DHOs said HIV programs improved their management of 
information systems. 
Responses to Open-Ended Questions
After asking DHOs to categorize the overall effects of PEPFAR 
on health system components as positive, negative, or neutral, 
we prompted them to offer comments in response to open-
ended questions about specific positive and negative influences 
they had experienced. Staff capacity building, integration of 
HIV and non-HIV services, and improved access to medical 
supplies and funding emerged as salient positive themes. Key 
negative themes included vertical HIV programming linked 
to HIV-specific targets and objectives, set before arriving at 
the district level, leaving DHOs with little flexibility to address 
non-HIV health priorities, increased workload, and loss of 
health service staff to NGOs providing HIV services. Post hoc 
analyses revealed no discernible differences in the perception 
of PEPFAR between respondents with different professional 
titles or duration of tenure in the district (Table 2).
Positive Effects of PEPFAR Funding: Capacity Building
When we asked open-ended questions about the specific 
means by which PEPFAR had a positive effect on the non-
HIV health system, DHOs most often named training, 
mentoring, and capacity building as the key themes which cut 
across all components studied. The greatest number of DHOs 
said the most important positive effect of PEPFAR was on HR 
capacity, specifically the skills health workers gained. Two in 
three respondents said trainings had increased the ability of 
health workers to manage both HIV and non-HIV healthcare 
at levels ranging from Village Health Teams to skilled service 
providers. In the words of one respondent, HIV programs and 
district health offices “built capacity of staff in different skills 
making them competent in-service delivery not only for HIV, 
but also in non-HIV service delivery.” Beyond the component 
of HR capacity, many DHOs said additional training improved 
the management of medical supplies as well, outweighing in 
importance even the direct provision of medical resources. 
Moreover, many DHOs reported trainings were helpful across 
all other health system components. Trainings intended to 
improve M&E of HIV activities also provided skills that could 
be applied to tuberculosis (TB) control programs. Likewise, 
skill sets developed to manage pharmacies and forecast stocks 
of HIV medications also strengthened the supply chain for 
other essential medicines. 
Positive Effects of PEPFAR Funding: Integration
After training, the second most often named positive effect 
was the opportunity to integrate HIV and non-HIV program 
activities. Respondents reported this integration of services 
as most important to the components of M&E capacity and 
planning capacity. Integration allowed district health offices to 
supervise HIV services concurrently with non-HIV services 
using the same transportation and staff, and using forms and 
registers which included indicators necessary for the evaluation 
of both programs: “They [implementing partners] supported 
the district by funding the monitoring exercise of HIV programs; 
in turn, our staff used the opportunity to evaluate other district 
programs,” summarized one respondent. DHOs also reported 
positive effects on planning capacity, emphasizing program 
integration improved the ability of district health offices to 
plan together with various implementing partners working in 
the district. One DHO said, “HIV/AIDS organizations have 
increased multi-sectoral collaboration which has led to a more 
integrated planning system for the district.” In addition to the 
particular importance of integration for the components of 
M&E capacity and planning capacity, respondents also said 
the integration of HIV and non-HIV was important to all 
other components of the health system because district health 
offices could use medical supplies, transport, and funding for 
staff allowances procured through HIV programs to support 
non-HIV services as well. 
Positive Effects of PEPFAR Funding: Supplies and Funding
Thirdly, DHOs said the direct provision of medical supplies, 
transport, and staff allowances, whether through integration 
of HIV and non-HIV programs or direct support for non-
HIV programs, was a major positive effect of PEPFAR. This 
additional support for non-HIV activities was particularly 
important to the components of information management, 
management of medical supplies, and HR capacity. However, 
a sizable minority of DHOs also cited positive effects of 
directly supplied resources on resource mobilization and M&E 
capacity. Comments about the material support provided 
to bolster information management focused primarily on 
the provision of computer hardware, software, and internet 
connectivity at health centers, hospitals, and district health 
offices. Respondents said these resources helped data analysis 
and timely report submission. DHOs also reported direct 
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material support fortified management of medical supplies via 
the provision of a wider range of equipment. These supplies 
included microscopes and other lab equipment, refrigerators 
for cold chain expansion, reagents for diagnostic tests, and 
buffer stocks of sundry medications for the treatment of 
malaria, TB, and other bacterial infections. 
Negative Effects of PEPFAR Funding: Vertical Programming
Many DHOs reported PEPFAR’s vertical nature and narrow 
focus came at the expense of, or did not sufficiently address, 
public health priorities other than HIV. Many DHOs critiqued 
the verticality of HIV programs, while acknowledging 
beneficial spillover of resources. DHOs said the narrow 
focus of programming was most acutely damaging to the 
health system components of resource mobilization, M&E 
capacity, and planning capacity. Respondents said M&E 
capacity and planning capacity were health system building 
blocks which both benefited by integration of HIV and non-
HIV programming while also suffering from vertical HIV 
funding streams. This contradiction highlights the sometimes 
divergent ways DHOs perceived PEPFAR’s effects and 
suggests M&E capacity and planning capacity may be health 
system building blocks that experienced the most variable 
influence. A noteworthy minority of respondents commented 
on how few grant opportunities were available for non-HIV 
programming as well as the high number of monitoring 
reports required for HIV activities. Perhaps, though, the 
most counterproductive effect of PEPFAR mentioned by 
DHOs attributable to an overemphasis on HIV centered on 
how PEPFAR funding and support from NGOs changed 
the political and behavioral landscape in which district 
health offices operated. Addressing the ability of district 
health offices to advocate for more funding from the finance 
ministry, one respondent stated, the:
“Wrong perception [was] created that the health department 
has a lot of money because of many HIV activities, which 
makes it difficult for central and local government to allocate 
[additional] resources.” 
To complicate the matter further, in some cases district health 
offices themselves changed their resource seeking activities to 
become more passive and defer to NGOs: 
“The district is not writing proposals for non-HIV services 
funding because they are being ‘spoon-fed’ by HIV 
organizations, ie, they expect funds whether they [district 
health offices] apply or not.” 
The fact that health system leaders were more likely to say 
PEPFAR had harmed or had no effect on their resource 
mobilization than any other component underscores the 
importance of both of these challenges (Table 3).
Negative Effects of PEPFAR Funding: Increased Workload
DHOs reported the implementation of PEPFAR increased 
the workload for an already overburdened health workforce. 
With the scale-up of HIV services, district health offices faced 
the consequences of their own success, seeing an increase in 
the number of patients seeking care for HIV and non-HIV 
alike. Respondents attributed this phenomenon to a popular, 
albeit vague, understanding that all health centers had scaled-
up all health services. At the same time, DHOs said their 
offices were saddled with the burden of additional M&E, 
data analysis, and reporting to a variety of implementing 
partners, which often required unique and frequent reports. 
Meanwhile, many public sector health providers received a 
growing number of financially enticing offers to join the staff 
of NGOs, placing additional pressure on district health offices 
to fill vacancies: 
“HIV programs limit the district capacity to attract workers 
[overall] because everyone wants to work for these [HIV] 
programs. For example, when the district advertises for jobs 
they get no responses, but HIV programs are flooded with 
applications when they advertise.” 
Thus, in addition to shouldering a heavier burden of work, 
DHOs reported the additional pressure of counteracting the 
“glamorization” of HIV programs, as one respondent put it. 
Negative Effects of PEPFAR Funding: Internal Brain-Drain
Health sector leaders said the influx of NGOs recruiting 
health providers from the public sector with lucrative salaries 
was one of two ways PEPFAR caused, or at least contributed 
to, health system fragmentation and instability. Beyond the 
heavier burden of work and challenges filling vacancies, 
DHOs also saw the disparity in salaries between NGOs and 
the public sector as harmful to morale: 
“The monetary benefit [offered to NGO staff] affects other 
staff who are not working for the HIV organizations. This 
demotivates them because they see their colleagues benefiting 
a lot, which also compromises services offered.” 
Furthermore, respondents worried programs scaled-up with 
PEPFAR support would be abandoned by district health 
offices once funding “dries up.” 
District Health Officer Ideas About Reasons for Strengthening 
or Weakening of the Health System, 2005-2011
When asked to suggest ways by which PEPFAR may have 
improved the health system between 2005-2011, DHOs most 
frequently credited increased staffing levels and improved 
performance (Table 6). Respondents were particularly positive 
about improvements in the quantity and quality of health staff, 
making health centers better places to work and seek medical 
care. DHOs also frequently named physical infrastructure at 
health centers and availability of medications and medical 
supplies as key improvements in health system strength. 
Interestingly, only 12 of the 112 respondents used terms like 
“cross-cutting” or “spillover” to indicate the use of funds 
and resources procured for HIV programs being employed 
for non-HIV activities. Although the theme integration of 
HIV and non-HIV services surely includes similar concepts, 
resource spillover or integration seem to be relatively less 
important potential explanations for improvements in the 
health system than improved staffing or better access to 
medical supplies and facilities. 
As hypothesized, DHOs suggested an overemphasis on 
HIV programming was the most likely explanation for any 
potential negative effects of PEPFAR on the health system. 
According to one respondent, “the mindset of people 
handling HIV programs [is] that HIV is presumed to have 
more funding, and they are less interested in programs other 
than HIV.” Most respondents, however, pointed to underlying 
and environmental conditions including run-down health 
facilities and poor transportation rather than the effect of 
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PEPFAR programs themselves. The largest number of DHOs 
named understaffing as the most important factor for low 
performance. They also frequently cited insufficient health 
sector funding, poor health infrastructure, lack of transport, 
and negative community attitudes towards the health system. 
For example, one health sector leader offered the potential 
explanation that Uganda has:
“Poor infrastructure for non-HIV services -- like you find 
health center IIIs [facilties designed to serve catchment area 
populations up to 20 000 people at the sub-county level] 
could have been given a mandate to handle deliveries, but 
due to poor infrastructure they cannot. So, people can’t even 
access it [routine care for births], and also health personnel 
don’t want to reside there.” 
Though increased workload caused by the scale-up of HIV 
services and the loss of some healthcare providers to HIV 
programs surely exacerbated these pre-existing challenges, 
many respondents stressed underlying infrastructural and 
health workforce challenges as potential explanations for a 
hypothetical worsening of the health system. 
Discussion 
Our goal was to understand how Ugandan DHOs viewed 
PEPFAR funding in relation to the overall health system with 
an emphasis on non-HIV health. Complementary analyses 
of quantitative indicators gathered from district health office 
records and reported elsewhere50 found no meaningful 
health system improvement or deterioration. However, our 
qualitative analysis of DHOs’ perceptions about PEPFAR’s 
influences found DHOs said PEPFAR generally strengthened 
the health system by improving medical training, integrating 
HIV and non-HIV activities, and directly providing additional 
resources. DHOs’ perceptions were not unanimously positive, 
and many said PEPFAR had exacerbated the loss of staff to 
NGOs, overemphasized HIV care, and increased workload. 
One possible explanation for the discrepancy between the 
largely positive findings of the qualitative assessment and 
the quantitative analyses showing no major improvement to 
non-HIV services utilization is that, working within a health 
system with limited resources, Ugandan DHOs were prone 
to view any substantial investment positively regardless of its 
objective downstream effect on service utilization. Another 
possibility is that DHOs’ statements reflect improvements 
to other measures, such as of process or quality of services 
that were not measured in the quantitative paper but have 
been demonstrated elsewhere.54 While quantitative outcome 
measures like numbers of pediatric outpatient care visits, 
TB tests, and in-facility deliveries do not reveal meaningful 
improvements as a result of PEPFAR,50 DHOs may nonetheless 
be largely satisfied with PEPFAR investments for helping the 
Ugandan health system to maintain non-HIV healthcare 
service delivery rates while quadrupling the number of 
patients on HIV treatment. 
The positive and negative reports of DHOs regarding PEPFAR 
are largely consistent with previous studies examining 
the effects of HIV initiatives on health system strength. 
A substantial body of literature demonstrates HIV care 
has improved as a result of investments in training, health 
infrastructure, and access to treatment.1,2,55 Ugandan DHOs 
in our study agreed, reporting health system strengthening 
to the extent that training, integration, and direct provision 
of medical supplies benefited both HIV and non-HIV 
programs. Answers suggest that in some circumstances, 
Ugandan DHOs were able to incorporate non-HIV activity 
into HIV-focused health system work. This approach took 
many forms, including sharing transportation for HIV care 
site visits, leveraging HIV planning sessions to also plan for 
other healthcare service delivery, and tasking additional staff 
paid by HIV programs to complete both HIV and non-HIV 
related work, while still fulfilling the objectives and scope of 
activities PEPFAR agreed to fund. 
Reports have also critiqued the narrowing of national health 
policies to focus on HIV programs,5,10,12 duplicative evaluation 
requirements,56 and doctors moving out of the public sector 
to work for HIV programs.4,6,14,57,58 Ugandan DHOs reported 
they experienced these challenges and confirmed these factors 
undermined the strength of the health system. 
Uganda’s DHOs reported broad satisfaction with PEPFAR, 
despite criticism of individual aspects and some negative 
consequences. The extent to which the intensity of PEPFAR 
investment in Uganda, as an influence distinct from its 
implementation strategy, is to credit for the 79% (Table 3) of 
Table 6. Uganda DHO Ideas on Potential Causes for Health System Improvements or Declines
Proposed Reasons for Overall Improvement Proposed Reasons for Overall Worsening
•	 Increased staffing levels and performance (70)
•	 Improved infrastructure, better access to health facilities (42)
•	 Better monitoring, management, support supervision (40)
•	 Increased availability of drugs and medical supplies (40)
•	 Increased community awareness, knowledge, demand for services (34)
•	 Staff morale, motivation, commitment, and vigilance (32)
•	 Presence of additional donors/partners not otherwise specified (31)
•	 Better integration of HIV and non-HIV services (24)
•	 Transport provided to service providers (19)
•	 Political support (18)
•	 Use of resources brought by HIV programs for non-HIV, “Cross-cutting,” 
“Spillover” (12) 
•	 Funding and staff focus overemphasizes HIV (39)
•	 Understaffinga (37)
•	 Insufficient health sector fundinga (26)
•	 Increased workload (23)
•	 Data quality issues (22)
•	 Staff loss to NGOs (18)
•	 Low staff morale, motivation (18)
•	 Poor infrastructure at health facilitiesa (16)
•	 Lack of transporta (15)
•	 Negative community attitudes towards health workers, servicesa (13)
•	 Absenteeism for trainings, outreaches (13)
•	 Continued stock-outs, lack of suppliesa (12)
•	 Poor roadsa (12)
•	 Health facilities hard to reach, poorly locateda (11)
Abbreviations: DHO, District Health Officer; NGOs, non-governmental organizations; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.
Data source: Interviews with Ugandan DHOs (or their proxies) in 112 districts between October and December, 2011. Number of respondents citing each 
effect in parentheses.
a Indicates underlying conditions rather than effects attributable to PEPFAR programs.
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responses citing an improvement in the health system remains 
an open question. In each year during the study period, 
PEPFAR expenditures surpassed Ugandan government 
funding of the health sector (Table 1). Improvements in 
health system HR capacity, integration, and access to medical 
supplies DHOs highlighted are certainly consistent with high 
intensity investment. Though, such high levels of PEPFAR 
funding may, or may not, be a necessary condition to receive 
largely positive reviews from DHOs. 
PEPFAR offered a major new source of funding in a weak 
health system starved for resources. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, DHOs would be generally happy to receive those 
resources as they struggled to organize services for rapidly 
growing populations with a high burden of disease. At the 
same time, DHOs were not asked how they would choose to 
direct the influx of PEPFAR resources for the greatest health 
benefits, so it is unsurprising they might have some criticisms 
about decisions regarding PEPFAR implementation made by 
foreigners and at the national level. 
During our interviews we observed DHOs were rather 
pessimistic about the long-standing weaknesses in health 
system infrastructure in Uganda including an overburdened 
health workforce, health facilities in disrepair, and insufficient 
medical equipment. Uganda’s population growth during the 
study period is unlikely a confounding factor. No DHO cited 
overall population growth as a key cause of increased stress 
on health workforce or facilities, and our quantitative analyses 
(described in Luboga et al)50 found most health service volumes 
grew only slowly or even declined between 2005-2011. DHOs 
attributed responsibility for these shortcomings to national 
policy and did not tend to hold PEPFAR accountable. Instead, 
they chose to highlight the positive gains PEPFAR offered 
(eg, increased staffing, facility improvements), even if the 
quantitative evaluation revealed only marginal strengthening 
of the health system.50
DHOs’ comments also contain a number of insights with 
PEPFAR policy implications. Though space does not permit 
listing of all implications, the three that follow are the authors’ 
synthesis of the largest portion of respondents. They are listed 
with recognition there may be ongoing efforts to address 
these issues in Uganda or elsewhere: 
•	 Ugandan DHOs recognize many of the services 
currently funded by PEPFAR will not be financially 
sustainable for the Ugandan MoH if PEPFAR funding 
ended. PEPFAR funding depends on both annual 
US budget appropriations and periodic five-year 
congressional reauthorizations. Thus, PEPFAR and 
other key stakeholders should consider engaging with 
the Government of Uganda to plan an increasingly 
sustainable and locally-led HIV-response.
•	 PEPFAR should consider continuing, and further 
emphasizing, its coordination with the Ugandan MoH 
during the annual Country Operational Plan (COP) 
budget planning exercise to ensure HIV activities are 
consistent with national priorities and funding pipelines 
complement each other.
•	 PEPFAR should consider encouraging the implementing 
partners through which it works to adopt policies which 
limit the loss of public sector healthcare workers to 
private HIV-focused NGOs.58
Funding for our research was provided through a PEPFAR 
Public Health Evaluation award through CDC, a US 
government agency with a major role in implementing 
PEPFAR in Uganda. UW co-authors received PEPFAR 
funding for multiple projects, including this one, and I-TECH, 
affiliated with UW, was a major implementing partner and 
recipient of PEPFAR funding in Uganda and elsewhere during 
the study period. Other limitations include the brief amount 
of time we spent with each DHO, which limited the depth of 
responses we received. The interview portions of our visits 
with DHOs were necessarily succinct. Indeed, our ability to 
have conversations with health officers in all 112 Ugandan 
districts, a unique strength of our research, is attributable to 
the efficiency of each visit. Our choice to rely on handwritten 
interview transcripts, rather than audio recordings, is also an 
inherent limitation of this approach. While we can generalize 
our findings to all of Uganda, observations are still limited 
to Uganda’s specific political, professional, and economic 
contexts and do not necessarily apply to the experiences of 
public sector health leaders with HIV initiatives in other 
countries. In many cases, respondents had not been appointed 
to their job or posted in their current district for the full 
duration of the 2005-2011 time frame we investigated. During 
the study period some DHOs were appointed or promoted 
to pre-existing districts, and others rose to DHO positions 
as Uganda decentralized its public health system and split 56 
districts into 112. We did not ask respondents to comment 
specifically on periods prior to their current placement 
and this analysis cannot assess how PEPFAR’s influence 
may have varied by district over the years. Additionally, the 
retrospective study design may have induced recall bias. 
DHOs may have been reticent to appear unappreciative of the 
significant financial contributions of PEPFAR by expressing 
criticisms and in some cases may have benefited personally 
from PEPFAR themselves, for example, through receiving 
per diem allowances to attend PEPFAR-supported trainings. 
Moreover, DHOs’ knowledge that our study was funded by 
PEPFAR may have limited expression of criticism. Therefore, 
our results may have under-reported negative perceptions of 
PEPFAR and over-reported positive perceptions. To minimize 
the likelihood this would happen, we informed respondents 
their opinions and statements would not be attributed to 
them personally and their names would not be used in 
data analyses or reports. We also conducted all interviews 
in private settings and trained the data collection teams to 
establish collegial rapport with respondents before beginning 
the interviews. Lastly, though PEPFAR comprised the large 
majority of Uganda’s budget for HIV/AIDS in during the 
study period, it is difficult to parse the discrete contributions 
of the various GHIs supporting HIV/AIDS programming in 
Uganda between 2005-2011. DHOs frequently mentioned 
PEPFAR by name in their responses, but it remains difficult 
to attribute specific results to the effects of a single funding 
stream. 
Conclusion
Ugandan DHOs reported PEPFAR strengthened their 
health systems between 2005-2011. However, DHOs were 
not unanimously or uniformly positive. While the overall 
satisfaction rate with PEPFAR approached 80% positive ratings 
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among DHOs, fewer than half reported an improvement in 
their ability to mobilize resources to strengthen the health 
system beyond HIV services. These challenges are neither 
new nor unique to the Ugandan context. As PEPFAR 
proceeds into its third phase, focusing on sustaining control 
of the HIV epidemic while gradually transferring leadership 
to ministries of health, increased emphasis has been placed 
on improved government engagement and health system 
strengthening.59,60 Still, the goals of PEPFAR-supported health 
system strengthening, and efforts to develop HRs for health, 
remain HIV-focused. 
DHOs also offered constructive criticisms of PEPFAR’s 
effects on other health system components. They tended 
to credit improvements in health system strength to 
PEPFAR’s influence, while attributing declines to pre-
existing shortcomings in health system infrastructure and 
workforce. This tendency is consistent with DHOs’ positive 
perception of PEPFAR’s effects, despite modest evidence for 
increased health service utilization from separate quantitative 
analyses.8,14,16,50,61 As HIV infection becomes a chronic disease 
requiring strong health systems to manage sustained patient 
care over time, Uganda’s weak health systems will require 
broad infrastructure development inconsistent with narrow 
vertical health programming. DHOs expressed significant 
concerns about what will happen to health system advances 
funded by HIV programs once PEPFAR ends. Ultimately, 
any improvements to either HIV or non-HIV health 
service delivery systems will depend almost entirely on the 
sustainability of activities undertaken with funding from 
PEPFAR and other donors. Nonetheless, health system leaders 
in Uganda at the district level were appreciative of resources 
aimed at HIV they could often leverage for broader purposes.
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